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I. INTRODUCTION
Discussions regarding the problem of identifying customary
international law have essentially focused on two principal issues. The first
relates to the inadequate manner in which the elements of custom reflect
any empirical reality, or lex lata, particularly when according greater merit
to the opinio juris of states.' Commentators have focused on a host of
customary norms, in particular areas of international law, such as
environmental law,2 human rights3 and international economic law. 4 These
commentators have concluded that these so called customary norms serve
as the jurisprudential basis of the relevant international laws are either not
customary due to a lack of state practice or are too indefinite to be
classified as any form of hard law. The second principal contention relates
to the relative nature of the sources of custom. The basic problem, when
* The author acknowledges the financial support of the Lady Davis Fellowship Trust,
Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel and the assistance of Dr. Moshe Hirsh. Dr. Hammer has
lectured at the University of Haifa and the University of London. Degrees received include: a
Juris Doctorate degree from Georgetown University, a LL.M. from New York University, and a
Ph.D. from the University of London.
1. See, e.g., Bruno Simma & Phillip Alston. The Sources of Human Rights Law:
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 Aus. Y.B. INT'L L. 82 (1992); Daniel
Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary) International Environmental Law, 3 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 105 (1995); Steven Zamora, Is There Customary International Economic
Law?, 32 GERMAN YB. INT'L L. 9 (1989); Phillip Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary
International Law, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986).
2. See Bodansky, supra note 1.
3. Simma & Alston, supra note 1.
4. Zamora, supra note 1.
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delineating opinio juris, is that the very purpose and nature of customary
law is being uprooted in deference to the perceived desires of states.'
In attempting to address these aforementioned contentions, some
commentators tend to stress the unavoidably pluralist structure of the
international community. Unique regional and cultural interests suggest the
need for a broader understanding of custom that makes it difficult to
identify a customary norm in any definitive manner.' Recognizing the
purpose of the key elements of custom, particularly the opinio juris of
states, is to reflect the basic structure of a customary norm.7
Commentators have suggested that the distinction between lex lata and lex
feranda has blurred.8 One, therefore, can claim that referring to opinio
juris enhances the role of custom as an adjudicatory source. Discerning
the values indicated in the opinio juris can provide a more clearer direction
for a judicial body applying the customary norm than the strict positivist
approach that tends to stress state practice. 9
Considering the problems associated with customary international law,
this article will account for the role of customary law within the domestic
legal system of states and the extent of the domestic application of
customary international human rights law. Applying customary
international human rights law in the domestic sphere might raise different
considerations than other areas of international law. Human rights serve to
regulate a states behavior towards individuals found within its borders. A
morally consequential form of reasoning regarding the utility of human
rights might incline a domestic legal actor towards different interpretations
of customary law. For example, a court might account for the underlying
purpose of human rights by considering broader sources when identifying
the obligation derived from customary international law.10
Following a discussion of the more general problems associated with
discerning customary international law, this article will consider Israel's
legal framework for incorporating customary international law. This
5. See, e.g., Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77
AM. J INT'L L. 413 (1983); Simma & Alston, supra note 1.
6. ANTONIO CASSESE, CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 88
(Cassese & Weiler eds., 1988).
7. See generally, MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS
CUSTOMARY LAW (1989); ABI-SAAB, CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-
MAKING 10 (Cassese & Weiler eds., 1988).
8. BROWNLIE, CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 70 (Cassese
& Weiler eds., 1988) noting the importance of political circumstances, the catalytic effect of
certain statements, and the modalities of application.
9. See also Tasioulas, In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and
the Nicaragua Case, 16 OXFORD. J. L. STUD. 85 (1996).
10. Isabelle Gunning, Modernising Customary International Law: The Challenge of
Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INTL. L. 211 (1991) (sovereign enacts human rights for benefit of
community and not as a reflection of an exercise of power).
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article will account for the manner in which the Israel legal system,
particularly the Israel Supreme Court, has applied customary international
law and the implications of such an approach for the future application of
customary international human rights law in Israel.
The reason for this focus on the Israeli system is that the Supreme
Court tends to place a rather strong emphasis on the state practice element
of custom. The positivist comprehension of the Court, however, tends to
reflect the problems associated with this approach. In particular, the Court
has been prone to subjective interpretations of the relevant norms and, at
times, an unrealistic perspective of the customary status of certain rules.
Furthermore, the Courts approach does not appear to conform with its
underlying reasoning for incorporating international customary law into the
domestic Israeli law." The significance of customary law for Israeli
jurisprudence is that custom creates an obligation on the sovereign state. 2
The state does not maintain an extra-legal status above the strictures of the
law, and therefore customary international norms can provide a common
core of binding human rights. This suggests a cosmopolitan international
framework for human rights, as opposed to an inter-statist approach
generally associated with a positivist perspective. 3 A reference to the
opinio juris of states might provide a clearer adjudicatory source of custom
than would state practice.
This re-examination of the domestic applicability of customary
international human rights law in Israel also seems ripe given Israel's
ratification of the principal human rights treaties during the early part of
this decade. For example, Israel ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights, Convention on the Rights of the Child, Convention to
Eliminate Discrimination Against Women, and the Convention Against
Torture. Coupled with the enactment of two important Basic Laws 4 that
strength the status of civil rights in Israel,' 5 one can consider the
applicability of provisions within these ratified but non-incorporated
treaties 6 that embody customary international law.
11. As compared to a treaty that generally must be incorporated pursuant to a specific
statute.
12. See discussion infra. The Israel Supreme Court has also identified the fact that Israel
is a mixed jurisdiction as another reason for incorporating custom.
13. Dower, Human Rights and International Relations, 1 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 86 (1997).
14. See, e.g., Karp, Basic Law: Human Dignity And Freedom - A Biography of A Power
Struggle, 1 MISHPAT UMEMSHAL 323 (1992) (in Hebrew).
15. David Kretzmer, The New Basic Laws on Human Rights: A Mini-Revolution in Israeli
Constitutional Law?, 14 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 173 (1996).
16. Ruth Lapidoth, International Law Within the Israel Legal System, 24 IS. L. R. 451
(1990); Yeffa Zilbershats, Role of International Law in Israeli Constitutional Law, 4 MISHPAT
UMEMSHAL 47 (1997) (in Hebrew); Rubin, Adoption of International Treaties into Israeli Law
by Israeli Courts, 13 MISHPATIM 210 (1983-84) (in Hebrew).
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II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A SOURCE
Customary international law is composed of an objective element
regarding the actual practice of states, and a subjective element that the
state believes it is acting under a legal obligation, otherwise referred to as
opinio juris. " One of the key problems in discerning custom is the
independent relative importance of each of these elements and the proper
reference materials for determining their normative content. For example,
customary international law has been prone to uncertainty as a viable
source of law given the difficulty in identifying state practice or the vague
nature of opinio juris. 8 This form of criticism gained credence particularly
after a variety of International Court of Justice [hereinafter "ICJ"]
decisions emphasized the importance of ancillary sources, such as UN
Resolutions, to establish the grounds for the opinio juris of emerging
customary norms.' 9
In response to this problem, some commentators have adopted a more
realistic approach towards customary law by accounting for factors such as
international relations" that causally persuade states to engage in similar
behavior due to surrounding economic or political circumstances rather
than from a binding legal obligation. Alternatively, other commentators
point to the importance of upholding a viable international legal system by
stressing a strong statist paradigm2' or focusing on other international law
sources, such as treaties, as an efficient normative source for developing a
state's customary law obligations.' One of the key reasons for referring to
treaties as a source of custom is that with the lessened homogeneity of
states and the increased need for clear and effectively, responsive
international doctrine resulting from the growing inter-dependency of
states. Custom has been deemed a rather slow and cumbersome source for
developing international law.3 Because treaties are a written instrument
and provide for a deductive application of predetermined rules, they can
serve as a key source for entrenching a customary human right. As
17. See, e.g., North Sea-Continental Shelf Cases (FRG/Denmark;FRG/Netherlands),
1969 I.C.J Rep.
18. A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20 YALE J.
INT'L L. 1 (1995).
19. See, e.g., Merits, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States), 1986 ICJ Rep. 14.
20. See, e.g., Fidler, Challenging the Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the Future of
Customary International Law, 39 GERM. Y.B. INT'L L. 198 (1996).
21. Weil, supra note 5.
22. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw (1983); Leslie
Deak, Customary International Labour Laws and their Application in Hungary, Poland, and the
Czech Republic, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 11-12 (1994).
23. See, e.g., THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND CODIFICATION
(1972); VAN HOOF, supra note 22.
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acceptance and application of treaties develop, one can elicit an opinio juris
by states concerning the treaty obligations, and, as states interact with the
international bodies established under the treaties, a subsequent change in
state practice.24
In the international human rights field, there is also a tendency to rely
on statements and declarations made by states in international forums or
during the drafting of an international document. 5 Considering the broad
range of available sources for deriving international norms, such as United
Nations General Assembly Resolutions26  or reports from Non-
Governmental Organizations [hereinafter "NGO"], human rights
commentators attempt to expand the reach of customary international law.27
One of the basic problems with relying on sources derived from
international organizations is that it tends to reduce the normative basis of
international law.' States might support a particular idealistic notion in
international forums but hesitate to uphold those ideals in practice. Hence
while it is tempting for states to designate a particularly horrific act, such
as torture, as being prohibited by customary law, it is equally important to
provide for the enforcement of the norm in a realistic and effective
manner.
29
Nonetheless, the alternative, positivist, approach tends to overlook the
benefits of referring to opinio juris. As an adjudicatory tool, opinio juris
can assist the judicial determinacy of the norm by clarifying the underlying
value of the norm. Custom derives from a shared understanding of states
and, particularly in the human rights field, fundamental principles that
structure the evolution of customary norms.30 As a result, there is a certain
amount of commingling between the elements of state practice and opinio
juris when considering the customary law status of a human right norm.
One can demonstrate the significance of opinio juris as assisting to
apply a customary rule in a uniform manner upon considering the
enforceability of custom in the domestic legal framework of the majority of
24. See discussion infra. The drawback to this approach is that a treaty is a separate
source of law, such that its utility as a source of custom will depend on the number of states
ratifying and incorporating the treaty in question.
25. MERON, supra note 7; Richard B. Lillich, The United States Constitution and
International Human Rights Law, 3 HARV. HuM RTS.J. 53 (1990).
26. Sloan, General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years After), 58 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L 39 (1987) (discussing the relationship between GA Resolutions and custom).
27. MERON, supra note 7.
28. Weil, supra note 5.
29. Weisburd, supra note 18.
30. Michael Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship Between Jus Cogens and Erga
Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J. INTL. L. 211 (1997) (asserting that, in certain instances,
consideration of state practice can be a facilitative factor rather then a necessary exercise).
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states. 3 While application of the customary norm in the domestic sphere
might be subject to different interpretations, the underlying values that
shape and form the rule can serve as guidelines for a domestic entity
charged with enforcing customary principles.32 Considering the opinio
juris of a customary law enhances judicial determinacy and with it the rule
of law while allowing for a relative application of the norm.33 A better
understanding of the application of customary norms in domestic legal
systems, notably in Israel, will clarify the reason for stressing a unitary
basis for the substantive dimension of the source of custom.34
States generally accept the automatic incorporation of customary
international law into the domestic legal sphere. In Germany for example,
Article 25 of the Grundgesetz, or Basic Law, binds the states to uphold
customary international law. The courts look to the Federal Constitutional
Court, or Supreme Court, to determine whether a norm has attained the
status of custom.35 In Italy, customary international law also maintains a
normative status that places it above the domestic law.36 While it is
difficult to disentangle instances in which the courts have referred
exclusively to custom as opposed to constitutional principles, the courts
have referred to the customary international law status of the right to
housing, own property, equal protection of the law for aliens, and the right
against discrimination.
The United States arguably 37 recognizes that international customary
norms are applicable in its domestic courts, with some commentators
31. See, e.g., Enforcing International Human Rights in Domestic Courts (Conforti &
Francioni eds., 1997).
32. See, e.g., ABI-SAAB, supra note 7 (noting that the elements of custom can provide
the procedure forcreating and discerning the rule).
33. Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in United States
Courts: A Comparative Perspective, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1992) (concluding that the lack of
application of customary law is partly due to insufficient precision of the norms).
34. Tasioulas, In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and the
Nicaragua Case, 16 OXFoRD. J.L. STUD. 85 (1996) (for example equates a similar interpretation
with the international legal systems goal to achieve peaceful coexistence among states).
35. Note that unlike the United States and United Kingdom, domestic legislation in
Germany cannot override a customary international norm.
36. FRANCIONI, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
ENFORCEMENT: REFLECTION ON THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE IN ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS, (Conforti & Francion eds., 1997).
37. Some commentators assert that domestic courts generally do not abide by customary
norms, and where they do, it is limited to specific instances involving maritime law cases.
Trimble, supra note 1; Weisburd, supra note 18, (citing United States v. Alvarez Machain 112
S.Ct. 2188 (1992) and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack
Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern
Position, 110 HARV. L. REv. 815 (1997).
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asserting that custom supersedes prior federal law.38 The principle, as
noted in the United States Courts, is the binding nature of international
rules over sovereign states.39 While reference to customary law by United
States Courts has been rare, as well as subject to controversy, 4° customary
international human rights norms have served as the basis for a number of
legal actions.4' Customary international law maintains a similar status in
Chile42 and Argentina.43
The United Kingdom considers customary international law to be part
of the domestic law, save if it conflicts with an existing law." Canada also
adheres to a similar adoptive approach to customary law.45
A. Customary International Law in Israel
In Israel, like the United Kingdom, custom has automatic binding
status in the domestic law' unless the customary norm is contrary to an
38. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555 (1984); Lillich, supra note 25.
39. This notion can be traced back to Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). The
most widely cited case is The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). The proposition that it
stands for automatic incorporation of customary law is subject to debate on both historic and legal
grounds. See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 1; Weisburd, supra note 18; Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 37.
40. Cf. Weisburd, supra note 18 with Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and
the Presumptive Power ofInternational Law, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 295 (1995).
41. For example, the Alien Tort Statute provides that an alien may raise a tort claim
against another alien who committed breaches of the law of nations. See e.g., Bayefsky and
Fitzpatrick, supra note 33.
42. VICUNA & BAUZA, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE JUDICIARY; NEW TRENDS IN THE LIGHT OF THE CHILEAN EXPERIENCE
IN ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS; supra note 36, at 135.
43. VINUESA, DIRECT APPLICABILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTIONS WITHIN THE
INTERNAL LEGAL ORDER THE SITUATION IN ARGENTINA IN ENFORCING HUMAN RIGHTS; supra
note 36, at 149.
44. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995); Andrew J.
Cunningham, The European Convention on Human Rights, Customary International Law and the
Constitution, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 537.
45. BAYESKEY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN CANADIAN COURTS; supra
note 36, at 295.
46. Ruth Lapidoth, International Law Within the Israeli Legal System, 24 ISR. L. REV.
451 (1990); Yaffa Zilbershats, The Adoption of International Law into Israeli Law: The Real is
Ideal, 25 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 243 (same article in Hebrew - 24 MISPATIM 317 (1994/95);
Zilbershats Role of International Law in Israeli Constitutional Law, 4 MISHPAT UMEMSHAL 47
(1997) (in Hebrew); Rubin, Adoption of International Treaties into Israeli Law by Israeli Courts,
13 MISPATIM 210 (1983-84) (in Hebrew); Shtampfer v. Attorney General, 10 PD 5 (1956)
(sovereign state is required to abide by customary law).
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existing law.4 7 In determining the criteria for establishing customary
international law, the Israeli Courts have turned to Article 38(1)(b) of the
statute of the ICJ.4" The Article defines custom as a stable, consistent, and
general practice that is broadly acknowledged in international circles as
binding, with an emphasis on the fact that the norm has acquired binding
legal force in the majority of nations." An ambiguous provision in the
domestic law will impel the Israeli Courts to incorporate a customary
international norm into the domestic law,5" with the presumption that the
legislature is acting within the dictates of a customary norm.
5
'
While the Israeli Court acknowledges the importance of opiniojuris as
demonstrating a state's sense of obligation, the Court tends to stress state
practice as a key part of the doctrine of custom. Adhering to a standard
that the practice must be established, general, and constant, the Israeli
Supreme Court states it is the practice of the subjects of international law,
i.e., the states, that is to serve as the key aspect in establishing custom.
5 2
The Israel Supreme Court noted that the basis for establishing custom
cannot be the values emerging from international entities since the latter do
47. Ruth Lapidoth, International Law Within the Israeli Legal System, 24 ISR. L. REV.
451 (1990) (citing) Steinberg v. Attorney Genera, 5 PD 1061 (1951), noting that a governmental
regulation might be subject to customary law, referring to dicta in American-European Beth-El
Mission v. Minister of Welfare, 21 (ii) PD 325 (1967) (regulation conflicted with right to freedom
of religion). A similar idea applies in the United States, see Michael Glennon, Raising the
Paquette Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Law by the Executive
Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 321 (1986).
48. See, e.g., Abu Itta v. Commander of Yehuda and Shomron, 37(ii) PD 197 (1983) at
231. Note that international commentators have criticized Article 38(1)(b) as being defective
because the definition is inverted; general practice is evidence of custom. See, e.g., Fidler,
Challenging the Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the Future of Customary International Law,
39 GERM. YB. INT'L L. 198 (1996). Karol Wolfke asserts that the travaux preparatoires to the
ICJ Statute indicate that the drafters had no clear idea regarding the structure of custom. Wolfke,
Custom In Present International Law (1993).
49. Ruth Lapidoth, International Law Within the Israeli Legal System, 24 ISR. L. R.
451, 454 (1991) (citing to Abu Itta v. Commander of Judea and Samaria, 37 (ii) PD 197 (1983).
Cf. Eyal Benvenisti, The Influence of International Human Rights Law on the Israeli Legal
System: Present and Future, 28 ISR. L. R. 136 (1994) noting a possible different standard for
proving customary humanitarian norms. See, e.g., Taha v. Minister of Defense 45(ii) PD 45
(1991) at 52-54.
50. Hilu, et. al. v. State of Israel, et. al., 27 (ii) PD 169 (1973) at 177. See also, Affu,
et. al. v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank, et. al., 42(ii) PD 4, 35, 76 (1988)
(translated in 29 ILM 139); Shimshon v. Attorney General, 4 PD 143 (1951) (apply international
law where legislature did not consider the succession of the state to the Mandate requirements).
51. Eyal Benvenisti, The Influence of International Human Rights Law on the Israeli
Legal System: Present and Future, 28 ISR. L. R. 136 (1994), citing 2 BARAK, Interpretation of
Law, 576, 580 (1993); 3 BARAK, Interpretation of Law, 354 (1993).
52. See, e.g., Abu Itta v. Commander of Yehuda and Shomron, 37(ii) PD 197, 238-39
(1983).
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not address the putative customary values in any practical sense. Although
ideals are an important indicia of custom, state practice represents a more
realistic and entrenched element.53
Following this approach, the Supreme Court tends to apply custom in
a somewhat subjective fashion. For example, the Court has repeatedly
held that the Fourth Geneva Convention is not customary law and therefore
inapplicable.54 Alternatively, the Court has relied on subjective applications
of military necessity to avoid the possible customary obligations of the
state .5
Professor Benvenisti explained the Supreme Court's understanding of
custom as an attempt by the Court to counter-balance the lack of other
avoidance doctrines in Israeli jurisprudence, such as the act of state or
political question doctrines. He also interprets the Courts narrow
application of custom as reflecting a desire to incorporate a deference to
the national security considerations confronting the state.56
The noted reasons for favoring a strict interpretation of customary law
however are descriptive only. They refer to domestic interests that might
apply only after determining the existence of a customary norm.57 Hence,
while the act of state doctrine might provide a basis for narrowing the
application of customary law, such an argument ignores the functional
purpose of custom in international and domestic law as creating a
recognized set of common principles among states. Additionally, domestic
standards of national security need not be central factors when considering
the relevance of customary international human rights since customary
international human rights norms can assist to shape the contours of
security considerations in a manner that conforms with international law.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's interpretation of state practice
appears to be excessively literal and seems to overlook the role of
international sources that shape the practices of states and define the
contours of the customary law. Determining state practice is not a literal
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Shahin et al. v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Area of Judea and
Samaria, 41(i) PD 197 (1987) (family re-unification is not an obligatory right nor is it covered by
the Fourth Geneva Convention); Kwasama v. Minister of Defense, 35(i) PD 617 (1981)
(prohibition of expulsion only applies to mass expulsions under the Geneva Convention).
55. Taha v. Minister of Defence, 45(ii) PD 45 (1991) (state may fine parents if their
children commit disturbances in the Occupied Territories).
56. EYAL BENVENISTI, THE ATTITUDE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN ISRAEL TOWARDS
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN DOMESTIC COURTS 207, 213-14 (Conforti & Francioni eds.,
1997); Benvenisti, The Applicability of Human Rights Conventions to Israel and to the Occupied
Territories, 26 ISR. L. R. 24 (1992).
57. See, e.g., Matar v. Minister of Defense, 43(iii) PD 542 (1989), where the Israel
Supreme Court held that the Geneva Convention is not customary law and that deportations of
individuals associated with terrorist organizations may occur in the interest of national security.
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exercise but accounts for a broader more objective view of custom. 8
Instances might occur whereby states entertain strong opinio juris, such
that the material practice is a secondary consideration that might not reflect
the emerging customary standard.
If one were to adhere to a strict account of state practice in the
domestic sphere, it is conceivable that states would reject almost all
customary norms because of contrary state practice. For example clearly
states consider torture to be an unacceptable act under customary
international law, yet the practice of torture still unfortunately abounds.
Similarly, as decided in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ relied on the
prohibition of the use of force in the United Nations Charter as a
customary norm despite contrary state practice. The ICJ relied on the
manner in which states tend to justify their- acts of force, by denying any
breach of the Charter or attempting to justify their actions as falling within
the framework of the Charter. It did not however limit the examination to
a hard-look at state practice. 59 Furthermore the ICJ noted that while
regularity of behavior is important, there is no need for complete
uniformity of behavior' ° particularly concerning human rights, which the
ICJ has intimated can derive from customary law sources.6
While the focus on the actual practice of states is proper since it is the
states that create and uphold custom, actual practice does not adequately
account for developments within international organizations.
Commentators have deemed a variety of United Nations Resolutions as
reflective of custom, or at the very least as guidelines for the proper
conduct of states that can reflect the development of a customary norm.62
This argument is significant given the large number of states that have
emerged following the creation of the United Nations, thereby suggesting a
58. Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. Int'l L. 1 (1974-
75) (defines state practice as any act or statements by a State from which views can be inferred
about international law).
59. A similar approach was indicated in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J Rep. (when the ICJ deemed the Geneva Conventions equivalent to
customary law given the large number of states that have signed the document and the opinio juris
deriving from statements made in international forums).
60. The fact that the ICJ was dealing with the prohibition regarding the use of force
might account for its rather elastic interpretation of the development of a customary norm. See,
e.g., D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101 (1987).
61. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), (1980) I.C.J Rep. 3, para. 91; Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), (1986) I.C.J Rep. 14, para. 267. See also,
Rodley, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the World Court, 38
INT'L COMP L.Q. 321 (1989) (interpreting the ICJ cases as recognizing the customary status of
a variety of human rights).
62. Danilenko; The Theory of Customary International Law, 31 GERM. Y.B. INT'L 9
(1988).
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different pattern for, and relevance of, the elements of custom. Given the
organizational role of international entities that influence the procedural
development of custom, international forums can offer a strong platform
from which to discern the existence or emergence of a customary norm.'
International forums also serve to consolidate a variety of international
interests, including the individual and other interest groups, such as NGOs,
that operate in the human rights arena. Unlike other customary
international laws that might derive from the actual state practice between
states, human rights norms involve the actions of different actors and set of
interests, further intertwining state practice and opiniojuris.
It appears that discerning custom for the Israel Court becomes a
comparative exercise of domestic law of states, at the expense of other
international law sources.' In reality, custom for the Supreme Court
seems to be the third source of international law mentioned in the ICJ
statute,' namely the general principles of international law. General
principles differ from custom in that the former entail an examination of
the national legal systems of states to obtain a common core of fundamental
principles that are necessary in a legal society.' While general principles
can assist to find and interpret a customary principle,' the focus is on
national legal systems in an attempt to discern a fundamental legal norm, a
rather different approach than custom, which is a less obvious source of
law that applies to a broader range of circumstances.'
Recognizing the inclination in Israel towards a realist approach to
custom, finding the proper grounds for the domestic application of a
customary principle that also incorporates recent developments in the
international arena might be difficult. While the substance of a customary
rule might derive from international sources, the authoritative basis for
applying custom in the domestic sphere clearly is derived from a domestic
source of law.' Hence even when the Court considered international
63. Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L 529 (1993).
64. See, e.g., Taha v. Minister of Defence, 45(ii) PD 45 (1991) (where the Israel
Supreme Court referred to the domestic laws of other states to demonstrate that a state may
control the oversight that parents are to maintain over their children).
65. Article 38(1)(c).
66. M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to General Principles of International
Law, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 768 (1990); Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Research on the General
Principles of Law Recognized by Ovilised Nations, 51 AM. J. INT'L 734 (1957); Linda J. Maki,
General Principles of Human Rights Law Recognized by all Nations: Freedom From Arbitrary
Arrest and Detention, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 272 (1980).
67. Bassiouni, supra note 66.
68. But see Simma & Alston, supra note 1.
69. Harold Maier, The Authoritative Sources of Customary International Law in the
United States 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 450 (1989).
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sources that might assist to indicate the practice of states, 70 deference was
accorded to the domestic interpretation of customary international law. As
noted by Israel Supreme Court Justice, Professor A. Barak, regarding the
applicability of customary international law: "As long as there is no
development of practical customary international law, there is no escape
from the fact that every state is to apply the accepted measure for this
matter pursuant to the dictates of its domestic laws." 7' It is therefore
important to understand why the Israel Supreme Court prefers to accord
custom a particularly elevated status. It is possible that the particular
reasons for upholding the direct application of customary international law
in the domestic sphere might broaden the reference to custom in other
situations that not only consider state practice, but also account for the
international framework and Israel's obligations that derive therefrom.
This functional understanding of custom will assist to elucidate the
normative theory of adjudication adopted by the Court, thereby making it
easier to expand on the importance of relying on a broader set of elements
when determining the substantive basis of custom.
B. The Principles Behind the Rule
In The Queen of Right in Canada v. Edelson and others,72 the Israel
Supreme Court outlined the underlying rationale for the automatic
application of custom in the domestic law.' The first reason noted was
that Israel mirrors the United Kingdom common law, particularly as a
result of the Israeli Legislature's adoption of the previous Mandate Law.
The result is that Israel law provides for automatic acceptance of customary
law principles without the need for enabling legislation.
While this might be a practical reason for incorporating custom, it
does not provide any particular rationale for the rule. Furthermore, it can
possibly lead to skewered decisions since it might bind the Israel Courts to
interpretations that cannot deviate from the United Kingdom law, even if
there is no contrary law in Israel.74 Nonetheless, one may stress here the
distinction between the substantive basis of custom, that would provide the
outline of the rule, and the authoritative basis of custom, that would serve
as the interpretative guide for binding the domestic courts. Professor
70. Shahin et al. v. Commander of IDF Forces in the Area of Judea and Samaria, 41(i)
PD 197 (1987) (right to enter country based on subjective interpretation of the Geneva
Conventions and narrow interpretation of human rights treaties).
71. Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada v. Edelson and others, Takdin-Elyon,
97(2) P.D. 5757-58 (1997) (translation from author) [hereinafter Edelson].
72. Id.
73. Although the Court did not base its reasoning on this point, the Court referred to
customary international law because there was no other source of legislation.
74. Lapidoth, supra note 16 (noting this, reason in discussing Shtampfer v. Attorney
General 10 PD 5 (1956)).
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Dinstein has noted that the basis for incorporating custom can derive from
the approach of the United Kingdom common law, however that does not
bind Israel to the United Kingdom domestic laws since application of the
rules derive from a domestic interpretation of the international sources.7'
Another reason offered by the Supreme Court focused on the notion
that Israel is a mixed jurisdiction.76 Justice Barak for example has stated
that Israeli law is a mixture of civil and common law characteristics that
has made it a unique legal jurisdiction. Legal sources are based on
legislative codes, the central role of the judge and academia, domestic
customs, comparative law, a fine balancing between a systematic and
casuistic approach, and unique procedural aspects such as the integration of
civil and religious law.' Hence, customary international law can serve as
a key source for developing domestic Israel law.78
This mixed jurisdiction approach explains the Supreme Court's
tendency towards state practice in other jurisdictions rather then referring
to international developments. The Court understands custom as a source
by which to buttress the existing law rather then treat it as a wholly
separate normative framework. In the decision The Queen of Right in
Canada v. Edelson and others,' the Supreme Court recognized the
customary notion of restrictive immunity for states, yet noted that the norm
is to be applied in a manner that conforms with both international law and
the basic legal values of the Israeli law.
In the context of customary international human rights, custom can
interpret domestic legislation where the law is either unclear or requires
clarification.' Pursuant to this reasoning, customary international human
rights can serve as an important source for domestic interpretation,
something that the Supreme Court has been hesitant to recognize.
An additional, and important, reason for invoking customary
international law in the domestic sphere is that a sovereign state has the
responsibility to uphold its international obligations.' Because custom is a
75. DINSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE (1971) (in Hebrew).
76. Id; Barak, The Israeli Legal System - Its Tradition and Culture, 40 MISHPATIM
197 (1991) (in Hebrew).
77. Barak, supra note 76.
78. Barak, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right, 41 HAPRAKLIT 271 (1993/94) (in
Hebrew); supra note 49.
79. Takdin-Elyon, supra note 71.
80. Barak, supra note 76.
81. Benvenisti, supra note 49.
82. See supra note 71; see also, Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Canada v. Edelson
and others, Takdin-Elyon, Vol. 97(2) 5757/5758-1997. See also, Rubin, Adoption .of
International Treaties into Israeli Law by Israeli Courts, 13 MISHPATIM 210 (1983-84) (in
Hebrew) mentions this as a key reason for upholding customary law in the domestic sphere.
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prime source for such responsibility, it is incumbent on the courts to apply
the responsibilities that are derived from customary norms.
While this reasoning is valid given that the state is the principal
international actor, one also must account for current developments in
international law. The notion of state sovereignty has undergone a change
due to the emergence of a variety of international developments such as
environment law and human rights.8 3 Given the role of international
organizations as key bodies for defining the obligations of the state, the
importance of referring to the doctrines emanating from international
organizations has increased. This increase is most apparent when
attempting to derive the customary obligations of a sovereign state.8'
Further, the Israel Supreme Courts reasoning demonstrates that
sovereignty is only a smaller piece in the larger international puzzle. The
law limits the activity of the state since the sovereign is a creature of the
law and not the master of the law. Sovereignty is not an extra-legal
principle that allows the state to act as it sees fit. Rather, as recognized by
the Supreme Court, sovereignty is a means to an end within the
international normative system, particularly when considering the role of
human rights and its domestic enforcement.
C. The Practical Applicability of Custom
The rationale of the Israel Supreme Court for directly incorporating
customary international law into the domestic law is based on the state's
responsibility as a sovereign and the constitution of Israel's legal system as
a mixed jurisdiction, being composed of elements of common and civil law.
One may now consider the practical applicability of custom in the domestic
sphere.
From a sovereign responsibility standpoint, what of the importance of
democratic or majoritarian rule, whereby the legislative branch is to pass
laws?85 Surely a sovereign state has an obligation to be true to the
mechanisms created by the internal political framework. It seems a
counter-majoritarian notion even to allow for the enforcement of a rule that
the legislative branch did not consider.86 This was the rationale of the
83. Daes, Status of the Individual and Contemporary International Law
E/CN.4/Sub.21989140 (1989); Martti Koskeniemmi, The Future of Statehood, 32 HARV INT'L
L. J. 397 (1991) (noting role of international law as facilitating development of human rights
while acknowledging important role of state to implement norms); Kahn, The Extinction of
Nation States, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 197 (1992) (role of state decreased with growth of
international organizations and human rights).
84. Gunning, supra note 10 (outside parties, such as international organizations and
NGOs, influence states and the manner in which states exercise their sovereignty).
85. Trimble, supra note 1; Weisburd, supra note 18 (discussing issue from federal/state
dichotomy, whereby applying custom can upset the federal balance).
86. Or even by the Executive branch, upon considering the rule that a new state is bound
by the previously developed standards of custom. For example, this automatic application of
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minority opinion in the Shtampfer decision,87 where Israel Supreme Court
Justice Goitein noted that only the legislature may create internal legislative
changes. Additional domestic policy issues, such as disruption of a state's
foreign policy due to enforcement of an international custom, forcing the
court to decide a political question, or the importance of national security88
are also factors that a state can raise when considering the enforcement of
custom in the domestic sphere.
Some commentators have addressed the counter-majoritarian problem
by noting that domestic courts serve as the best forum within which to
confront issues of applicability. 89  Courts attempt to adhere to
predetermined principles, be it a domestic or international source, without
any involvement in the underlying political debate.' Even regarding
domestic issues, courts must address cases that are not based on a
particular law such that a court must make recourse to their own
presumptive powers.
Additionally, one can interpret the application of a customary norm
within the domestic sphere as a means of completing the obligation created
by custom. An inherent problem with custom is that the subjective element
of opinio juris implies that an obligation already existed, thereby rendering
the customary obligation redundant. 91 However the obligation created by a
custom poses a problem for the People's Republic of China since they desire to rely on their own
sovereign actions. ZHAOJIE, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE ADJUDICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: A SURVEY OF THE PRACTICE AND PROBLEMS IN CHINA; supra
note 36, at 329.
87. Shtampfer v. Attorney General, 10 PD 5 (1956); See also, Justice Shamgars
reasoning in Afu et al. v. Commander of IDF Forces in the West Bank et al., 42(ii) PD 169
(1988).
88. These issues have been noted by Professor Eyal Benvenisti in THE ATTITUDE OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL TOWARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF HUMAN RIGHTS; supra note 36, at 207.
89. This is the practice for example in Germany where the Constitutional Court interprets
what is custom.
90. Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100
YALE L. J. 2277 (1991); FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE
RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992)
91. Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1
(1974-75); CHENG, CUSTOM: THE FUTURE OF GENERAL STATE PRACTICE IN A DIVIDED WORLD
513 (Macdonald & Johston eds., 1983), which addresses this conflict by noting how legal norms
are abstract rules that are intended to predict behavior by exerting a psychological pressure on a
state's future behaviour. Walden, The Subjective Elements in the Formation of Customary
International Law, 12 ISR. L. R. 344 (1977) notes that custom creates a normative standard
resulting from internal attitude of states towards a rule.
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customary norm can become an obligation deriving from custom once
enforcement of the norm occurs within the domestic sphere.'
In considering the role of custom in Israel, it is possible that deriving
the obligation from a domestic enforcement of the norm can have particular
relevance for international human rights obligations, where international
commentators tend to rely on opinio juris as a primary source of custom."u
Recognizing the appropriateness of a particular pattern of behavior, the
opinio juris crystallizes a variety of state perceptions towards a particular
norm. The norm inclines a state to alter its practice according to the norm,
particularly as states make an empirical judgement to acquiesce and
subscribe to the rule.' The combination of opinio juris and state practice
as binding the state in a normative sense, rather then merely reflecting or
declaring a desired standard, 9' can occur by way of the domestic legal
grounding of the norm' that will serve to solidify the norm.
Similarly, international human rights treaties can serve to embody the
elements of custom and provide a court with a reference to principles of
law by declaring a previously created customary rule, crystallizing an
emerging rule, or generating a new rule of custom. 97 As treaties enunciate
norms in a clear fashion, the emergence of a customary norm is easier to
detect, particularly as the customary norm develops over a time. 9 For
example, one can refer to a multilateral 'treaty as a source of emerging
customary law where the underlying goal of the treaty is to create a
universal consensus among the signatory nations. While the obligation to
92. Walden, supra note 91, alludes to this approach by distinguishing a claim that a rule
is binding from the eventual legal application of the rule in accordance with the proposed custom.
See also, Maluwa, Custom Authority and Law: Some Jurisprudential Perspectives on the Theory of
Customary International Law, 6 AFRICAN J. INT'L & COMP. L. 387 (1994) for an explanation of
Finnis' approach to this conundrum.
93. Indeed Cheng, supra note 91, focuses almost exclusively on opiniojunis, noting that
state practice will be altered in accordance with a state's acceptance of an obligation.
94. See Maluwa, supra note 92, at 402 (noting the importance of authoritative rules as
exclusionary reasons for action, particularly where the state acts in the absence of any clear or
understood reason).
95. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 2.
96. Walden, supra note 91, approaches custom as both a primary and a secondary norm
that raises the level of obligation to a greater status than mere declaration and action.
97. Schachter Entangled Treaty and Custom in International Law at a Time of Perplexity
(Dinstein & Tabory eds., 1989) (citing North Sea Continental Shelf Case FRG v. Denmark; FRC
v. Netherlands) ICJ Rep. (1969); Condorelli, CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS
AND PROSPECTS (Bedjzoui ed., 1991). Baxter, Treaties and Custom, I RECUEIL DES COURS
25 (1970).
98. Meron, The Geneva Convention as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 348 (1987)
(citing Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua
v. US) (1986) ICJ Rep. 14 regarding Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, where the ICJ
inferred it was custom yet travaux and prior usage were not so clear).
Hammer
abide by the treaty derives from specific treaty rules,99 the treaty may also
indicate an emerging opinio juris of a state and influence subsequent state
practice. Further, if a treaty creates a one-sided obligation on the state,
such as a human rights treaty, the relevance of the opinio juris in forming
the treaty will be quite significant in demonstrating the customary status of
a rule. State practice serves a secondary role since the practice required by
the treaty is, in itself, an obligation to alter one's practice. The binding
nature of custom emerges as a state's intent becomes entrenched and a
state's actions become influenced by the treaty.
Reflecting this approach are commentators who treat the two principal
elements of custom as being in an inverse relationship to one another.
Developing the grounds for demonstrating opiniojuris heightens the role of
opinio juris as a key element of customary law and proportionally lessens
the necessity to turn to state practice. " This inverse relationship between
the sources of custom, which the ICJ seems to support,'0 ° is significant for
instances where subsequent state practice contrary to an emerging
customary rule does not create strong enough grounds to form a new
customary norm upon considering the previous opinio juris. " Such is the
case with states recognizing norms as essential and basic to their survival
or because states maintain deeply held and widely shared convictions,
despite the possibility of contrary state practice subsequent to the
development of the norm.° 3 The utility in referring to treaties assists to
demonstrate the emerging opinio juris in a clearer fashion than would a
focus on state practice, particularly when addressing human rights norms.
The relationship between treaties and custom, whereby treaties assist
to shape the emerging opinio juris of a state as well as influence subsequent
99. As a state signs and ratifies a treaty, the state is subject to the variety of obligations
and requirements of the treaty, notably the pacta sunt servanda rule that binds the state to act in
good faith to uphold even a non incorporated treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
100. Schachter, supra note 97; Kirgis, Custom on a Sliding Scale, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 146
(1987) (sliding scale based on particular norm at issue).
101. Schachter, supra note 97 (referring to the Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Albania), 1949
I.C.J REP. 4, and the case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), 1986 ICJ REP. 14). See also, Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons 1996 I.C.J Rep.
102. One of the problems with interpreting the central elements of custom in an inverse
manner is that state practice can be unduly limited, thereby weakening the normative ground of
custom. Weisburd, supra note 18. Some commentators refer to other international sources as a
basis for developing human rights, such as the general principles of nations, Simma & Alston,
supra note 1, or attempt to devise a new form of source of law, such as declarative international
law. Bodansky, supra note 2; Chodosh, Neither Treaty not Custom: The Emergence of
Declarative International Law, 26 TEx. INT'L L. J. 87 (1991).
103. Schachter, supra note 97 (referring to prohibition against torture, large scale racial
discrimination, genocide or killing prisoners of war. Schachter notes that rules are relative to their
importance when considering their method of creation).
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state practice, is particularly important upon considering the manner in
which the Israel Supreme Court focuses on the state practice element of
customary international law. The statements made by states during the
drafting of a treaty that reflect an opinio juris can have greater significance
towards the emergence of a customary law than would subsequent state
practice. Indeed, some commentators assert that what is important in the
creation of a customary law, particularly when considered alongside a
treaty, are the statements made by the state during the drafting or
subsequent statements upon ratification. °4  The statements indicate the
intent by the states to create a binding obligation.
Nevertheless, one should be careful to avoid adopting what Professor
Koskeniemmi has termed a utopian approach when referring to the lex
feranda derived from a treaty negotiation.° 5 The inclination is to infer a
customary rule from state expressions in international forums, even without
the required state perception of the rule as legally obligatory.
Furthermore, a treaty rule operates in a similar manner to a customary rule
since the interpretative process is a subjective exercise that is affected by
the surrounding circumstances.106
One can remove customary law from this purely naturalist framework
by examining the underlying sources of opinio juris in a realist manner.
That would not only include consideration of the practice of states, but also
the manner by which a state incorporates the norms, as indicated by a
treaty ratification or by a states denial of any normative breach of the
relevant rule. A customary rule does not create a conclusive means of
domestic application and interpretation of the relevant rule upon
considering the surrounding factors that have contributed to its creation.'°7
At the same time, one should avoid an apologist approach' that
reduces custom to a mere tacit agreement among states or equates it with a
general principle of international law. The tendency can be to defer to the
wishes of powerful states at the expense of any actual development of a
customary rule from the overall will of the states. One can avoid this
approach by considering the relevant international materials that serve as
the substantive source, or grundnorm, for a customary law despite
differing state practice. Where indications exist that states desire to
establish a universal or broad rule, such as the ratification of a multilateral
104. Baxter, supra note 97; Akehurst, Custom as a Source of Intenational Law, 47 BRIT.
YB. INT'L L. 1 (1974-75); Cunningham, supra note 44.
105. MARTrI KOSKENIEMMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA (1989).
106. Chin Lim & Olufemi Elias The Role of Treaties in the Contemporary International
Legal Order, 66 NoRDic J. INT'L L. 1 (1997), referring to Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS
BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 73 (2nd ed. 1979).
107. Id.
108. Koskeniemmi, supra note 105.
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treaty,' O° the subsequent conformance of state practice to the rule will be
undertaken by states by way of different routes.
Regarding the mixed jurisdiction reasoning of the Israel Supreme
Court, the role of custom under this rationale would involve addressing
lacunae in the domestic law. Because domestic law can deviate from a
customary norm, reference to international standards can serve as a means
to an end in clarifying particular domestic laws. A court should not
approach custom as a supra-national legislative source of law but as
working in tandem with the domestic law, with a view towards
ameliorating the international and domestic standards."0 This approach
was noted by the Supreme Court in The Queen of Right in Canada v.
Edelson and others"' where the Court combined international and domestic
principles to interpret the scope of restrictive immunity to be accorded to a
state.
III. CONCLUSION
The aforementioned discussion regarding the reasons for upholding
custom in Israeli domestic law indicates that the substantive basis of custom
can allow for reference to norms deriving from international sources. The
fact that the Israel Supreme Court has hesitated to apply customary norms
due to its preference for strict state practice does not mean that customary
international law is wholly inapplicable in the domestic law. Israel's
jurisprudence can benefit from a broader reliance on customary
international norms, particularly where the domestic legislation requires
further interpretation. The Israel Supreme Court would do well to consider
international developments that in a broader, and even more realist, sense
indicate the actual practice of states.
Israel's ratification of the principal human rights treaties demonstrates
the emergence of an acknowledgement by the state of its human rights
obligations. International developments in the human rights context are
beginning to play a role within the domestic jurisprudence of Israel,
indicating the necessity for a broader approach to its obligations arising
from customary international law. It therefore is imperative to consider
situations where reference to customary international human rights law
might assist these domestic developments.
109. For example, a state not to reserve on a provision within a multilateral human rights
treaty that allow for a reservation demonstrates a state's intentions towards that provision as
reflecting a customary rule. What is more important, one can interpret the other articles that do
not provide for a reservation as reflecting custom, if associated with other customary provisions
and if the travaux preparatoires to the treaty indicate the emergence of a customary norm. See,
e.g., Baxter, supra note 97.
110. This demonstrates how custom and general principles differ in that determining the
latter would require one to stand on the outside and look into the domestic sphere.
111. Edelson, supra note 71, 97(2) 5757/5758-1997.
1998]
